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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

BUD ALLEN, et. ai,
Case No. 20060279
(Consolidated with
Case No. 20060280)

Petitioners,
v.

Utah Public Service
Commission Docket Nos.
04-057-04, 04-057-09,
04-057-11,04-057-13
and 05-057-01

UTAH PUBLIC SERVICE
COMMISSION, and
QUESTAR GAS COMPANY,
Respondents.

Pursuant to Rules 24, 26, and 27 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the
Utah Committee of Consumer Services ("Committee"), a state agency advocating on
behalf of residential and small commercial enterprise consumers regarding public utility
matters coming before the Public Service Commission of Utah, submits its Responsive
Brief in this case.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. §78-2-2(3)(e)(i) (2001).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Whether Appellants have standing to appeal the Commission's order

approving the settlement in this proceeding. This is an issue of law.
Standard of Review: Correction of error, granting the agency no deference.
Committee of Consumer Services v. Pub. Serv. Comm 'n, 75 P.3d 481 (Utah 2003).

1

2.

Whether the August 2004 Commission Order denying Questar Gas

Company ("Questar Gas" or "Utility") rate recovery of coal bed methane processing costs
governs the outcome of the issues of prudence and rate recovery in this proceeding. This
is an issue of law.
Standard of Review: Correction of error, granting the agency no deference.
Committee of Consumer Services v. Pub. Serv. Comm 'n, 75 P.3d 481 (Utah 2003).
3.

Whether the prudence of the February 1, 2005-forward coal bed methane

processing costs Questar Gas Company has asked to be included in rates should be
determined by considering the Utility's action and circumstances at the time it decided to
incur those costs or its action and circumstances at the time the processing plant was built.
This is an issue of law.
Standard of Review: Correction of error, granting the agency no deference.
Committee of Consumer Services v. Pub. Serv. Comm V?, 75 P.3d 481 (Utah 2003).
4.

Whether settlement by the parties of a long-standing and technically

complex regulatory dispute in accordance with statutory law encouraging the settlement
of disputes before the Commission should, absent extraordinary circumstances, be
contestable on appeal by persons who chose to not participate in the dispute proceeding.
This is an issue of abuse of discretion,
Standard of Review: Abuse of discretion. Morton International Inc. v. Auditing
Division, 814 P.2d 581, 587-91 (Utah 1991); Committee of Consumer Services v. Pub.

2

Serv. Comm 'n, 75 P.3d 481 (Utah 2003).
5.

Whether there is sufficient evidence in the record to support the

Commission's determination that the coal bed methane processing costs at issue were
prudently incurred and the resulting rates just and reasonable. This is an issue of abuse of
discretion.
Standard of Review: Abuse of discretion and substantial evidence. US West
Communications, Inc. v. Public Service Comm 'n, 901 P.2d 270, 273 (Utah 1995).
Morton InVl v. Auditing Division, Utah State Tax Commission, 814 P.2d 581, 586-87
(Utah 1991).
6.

Whether due process requirements of sufficient notice and a fair hearing

were complied with in this proceeding. This is an issue of law.
Standard of Review: Correction of error. Committee of Consumer Services v.
Pub. Serv. Comm % 75 P.3d 481 (Utah 2003).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The statutory provisions that may determine the issues raised in this appeal are
found in the Public Utility Statutes, Utah Code Title 54. They are the following:
Utah Code Ann. § 54-3-1 (2004)

Utah Code Ann.
(2006)
Utah Code Ann.
Utah Code Ann.
Utah Code Ann.

Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-1 (2004)
Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-12 (2004)
Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-15 (2004)

§54-4-4 (West Supp.
§54-4-26 (2004)
§54-7-13 (2004)
§54-10-4 (2004)

Other statutory provisions that may determine the issues raised in this appeal are:

3

Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-i9 (2004)
Utah Code Ann, § 63-46b-14 (2004)

Utah Code Ann, § 63-46b-13 (2004)
Utah Code Ann, § 63-46b-16 (2004)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Appellants' Opening Brief presents an argumentative and inaccurate review of
the factual and procedural background of this case. The Committee, therefore, rejects the
Appellants' Statement of the Case and provides its own,
/.

Nature of the Case
This appeal addresses the finality that should be accorded the settlement of a

technically and historically complex regulatory dispute by agreement of the participating
and informed parties. The settlement, and the Utah Public Service Commission's
("Commission") order approving it, address Questar Gas Company's ("Questar Gas" or
"Utility") duty to provide safe, efficient and reasonable natural gas service, and its
corresponding entitlement to rate recovery of operating expenses reasonably incurred in
the discharge of that duty. The Appellants' Opening Brief also asserts due process claims
of lack of adequate notice and bias on the part of the Commission Chairman,
2.

Course of Proceedings
The issue of Utility entitlement to rate recovery of coal bed methane gas ("coal bed

methane," "coal seam gas" or "CBM") processing costs goes back to the early 1990s
when new drilling and recovery technologies made commercial production of that gas
possible. The Utility first sought rate recovery of its CBM processing costs in a
November 25, 1998 application to the Commission, That application sought approval for
4

the Utility's contract with an affiliate for CBM processing services and for rate recovery
of the resulting costs in a 191 Balancing Account cost pass-through proceeding. The
Commission's December 3, 1999 order in that case (Docket No. 98-057-12) concluded
that the Utility must seek rate recovery in either a general rate case or an abbreviated rate
proceeding.l
As a result of that Commission order, the Utility, on December 16, 1999, filed a
general rate case (Docket No. 99-057-20) that included an application for rate recovery of
its affiliate contract costs for CBM processing services. After approving inclusion of the
record of the Docket No. 98-057-12 proceeding, the Commission's August 11, 2000 order
approved a disputed settlement ("C02 Stipulation") that allowed partial rate recovery of
the Utility's CBM gas processing costs despite a Commission finding that
the record is insufficient to permit us to determine whether the
Company's analysis of options. . . was sufficiently objective .
.. [or] options were ruled in or out as a result of the influence
of affiliate interests.2
The Commission concluded:
Clearly, QGC has the burden to demonstrate the decision to
enter the contract is a prudent one. Parties differ as to
l

The Utility appealed the Commission's decision to this Court, which set aside the
Commission's determination and remanded the case back to the Commission for further
action in accordance with this Court's ruling. Questar Gas v. Utah Public Service
Comm 'n, 34 P.3d 218 (Utah 2001). The Court's remand was addressed in further
proceedings before the Commission that culminated in its August 30, 2004 Order in a
consolidated Commission docket. That Order is a central focus of the Appellants' case.
Commission's August 11, 2000 Report and Order, Docket No. 99-057-20, p. 27.
5

whether it did so successfully. But whether or not QGC met
this burden, we can and do conclude that its decision to
procure gas processing has yielded the required result, that is
it has effectively protected the safety of its customers. This
means the costs of gas processing can be legitimately
recovered in rates.3
The Committee opposed the Utility-Division settlement and appealed the
Commission's decision to this Court (Case No. 20000893-SC), which, in an August 1,
2003 decision, rejected the contested settlement and the Commission's reliance on a
"safety rationale" to award rate recovery. This Court concluded:
If the record had permitted, the Commission could have
carried out its initial obligation to review the prudence of the
C02 plant contract and its terms, holding Questar Gas to its
burden of establishing that the decision to enter into the
contract and the cost it agreed to were prudent and not unduly
influenced by its affiliate relationship with Questar Pipeline.
Since the Commission found that no such record was or could
be made available, it should have refused to grant a rate
increase that included C02 plant costs. We therefore overturn
the Commission's decision to accept the C02 Stipulation and
to grant the rate increase proposed therein.4
Upon remand, and after giving the parties a further opportunity to marshal the
evidence in the record, the Commission, in an August 30, 2004 order in Docket Nos. 99057-20, et ai ("August 2004 Order"), concluded the Utility had failed to meet its burden
of proof of showing its affiliate contract for CBM processing services was prudent and

3

Id. (emphasis added).

'Consumer Services v. Public Service Com 'n, 2003 UT 29, 75 P.3d 481, 486 (Utah
2003).

rejected rate recovery of the June 1999 through May 2004 CBM processing costs at issue
in the settlement stipulation. It stated:
we conclude that Questar Gas has not met the burden of
proving its actions constituted a prudent response to the
introduction of lower Btu coal-seam gas into the Questar Gas
distribution system. .. . We therefore reject the C02
Stipulation and deny recovery of the processing costs during
the period from June, 1999 to May 2004.5

Commission's August 30, 2004 Order, p. 49. Contrary to the inferences and
assertions in Appellants' Opening Brief, the August 2004 Order ultimately determined
that the Utility failed to meet its burden of proof and not that the affiliate contract for
CBM processing was imprudent. Commenting on the insufficiency of the record for
purposes of making a prudence determination, the Commission noted at page 35 of that
order: "[t]oo many questions remain unanswered," and at page 45:
[o]n this record, we find that affiliate influence is clear. The
degree to which it is 'inappropriate'. . . is unknown because
explicit analyses by Questar management is (sic) absent.
The Commission commented even earlier on the insufficiency of the record for purposes
of determining prudence,(^^ "the record is insufficient" statement, page 5, supra), and it
commented yet again in its January 6, 2006 Order in this proceeding, stating, on page 33:
"[w]e were critical in our [August] 2004 Order of the lack of documentation in the
Company's decision-making process in 1997 and 1998." But then, on pp. 37-38 of that
order it stated (emphasis added):
"The Company [as shown by the record in this proceeding]
conducted a transparent decision-making process open to the
public and subject to scrutiny by any interested person.. . .
The Company identified the alternatives. . ., employed
reasonable methods and criteria in evaluating the alternatives,
and adequately recorded and documented its evaluation. The
Company carefully considered potential conflicts between
affiliates and placed the interests of its customers before those
of its affiliates. This process satisfies the concerns outlined in
our [August] 2004 Order,
1

Although it rejected rate recovery of the Utility's June 1999 through May 2004
CBM processing costs, the Commission concluded its August 2004 Order with the notice
that it would
address, in a separate docket, how to craft a long-term
solution to the compatibility of customer appliances with
natural gas containing coal-seam gas consistent with the
utility's obligation to provide safe commodity and service to
its customers.6
In accordance with that notice the Commission opened Docket No. 04-057-09 in
September 2004 and chaired thereunder six formal technical conferences that were held
from October 2004 through January 2005.
Following this regulatory review of the CBM compatibility problem and its
possible solutions, the Utility, on January 31, 2005, initiated this proceeding by filing an
application with the Commission (Docket No. 05-057-01, et. al) asking for rate recovery
of costs resulting from its decision to continue processing CBM by means of its existing
affiliate contract for processing services.
In April 2005, the Utility supplemented its application with written testimony and
documentary evidence. That testimony and evidence included: (1) 32 pages of sworn
testimony by Barrie L. McKay, with attached exhibits, Record 235, providing a
background history of the CBM problem, a statement of the rate recovery result the
Utility seeks in this proceeding, and the process it intends to follow for establishing its

Commission's August 2004 Order at 50.
8

prudence and entitlement to rate recovery; (2) 70 pages of sworn testimony by Lawrence
A. Conti, with numerous attached technical exhibits, Record 246, tracing the development
of FERC interstate pipeline regulation and standards; reviewing the difficulties of
providing interchangeable gas supplies to the northern and southern parts of the Utility's
distribution system, reviewing the 1998 decision to lower the heat content range of the
gas supply the Utility manages for customers, the temporary sufficiency of blending to
solve the CBM gas problem, the possible alternative remedies to solve that problem, and
why CBM gas processing is still the superior remedy; (3)31 pages of sworn testimony by
Robert A. Lamarre, with accompanying exhibits, Record 279, tracing the development of
CBM production in the United States, identifying the size of CBM reserves in the
Rockies and elsewhere, and showing the value of CBM as a new gas supply resource and
why the large growth in commercialization of that gas could not have been accurately
predicted prior to 1998; (4) 30 pages of sworn testimony by Alan J. Walker, with
accompanying exhibits, Record 283, showing the quantifiable benefits of CBM
production for Utility customers; (5) 23 pages of sworn testimony of Robert O. Reid,
PH.D.,with accompanying exhibits, Record 297, on further savings that accrue to Utility
ratepayers because of the accessibility of CBM gas production; and (6) 23 pages of sworn
testimony of Charles Benson, with accompanying exhibits, Record 304, showing CBM
gas combustion tests and analyses.

9

After extensive discovery and analysis of the Utility's application by the
Committee and Division and their retained expert consultants,7 the parties negotiated and
concluded a comprehensive settlement that disposed of the outstanding issues and
allowed the Utility to recover CBM gas processing costs incurred after January 31, 2005.
The parties' settlement was regularly noticed-up on October 11, 2005 for an
October 20, 2005 Commission hearing. At the hearing, witnesses for the parties testified
regarding the development of the case, initial party positions and the basis for each
party's settlement position.
Mr. Dan Gimble, testified for the Committee. He summarized the report and
conclusions of Committee expert consultant, Mr. Dwight Pfenning of Causey
Engineering, Dallas, TX, that the presence of CBM in the Utility's distribution system did
result in an increased safety risk due to increased carbon monoxide levels and flame rollout, for customers using gas furnaces and water heaters that had not been adjusted to bum
a lower Btu gas stream.8
Mr. Gimble distinguished the Committee's position in this proceeding from its
position in earlier proceedings where it opposed any rate recovery of CBM processing

Commission's January 6, 2006 Order, p. 36. The Committee retained expert
consultants to review the Utility's Application after Mr. Ball's departure as Director of
the Committee in March 2004.
Reporter's October 20, 2005 Transcript of Proceedings, Docket Nos. 04-057-04;
04-057-09; 04-057-11; 004-057-13 and 05-057-01, pp. 33-34, Record 2297. The
Committee had maintained in earlier proceedings that the Utility had never clearly
demonstrated that CBM was a safety threat to customers.
10

costs. He stated the Committee's cost causation argument in earlier proceedings
"becomes less credible" as a result of the evidence in the record of this proceeding that
shows the Utility is now purchasing "substantial volumes of coal seam gas supplies in
recent years" - "25 to 40 percent of its overall market purchases." In past cases "Questar
was purchasing minimal amounts of coal seam gas for its customers, I think less than 5
percent," and the Committee was able to argue "the coal seam gas was contractually
destined for other markets but was reaching the Wasatch Front via displacement and
providing really no offsetting benefit to the C02 [processing] costs" the Utility was
seeking to pass on to customers. Now, however, "[t]he simple fact is that Questar [Gas]
has increasingly relied on coal-seam gas to meet its growing retail demand
requirements."9
Mr. Gimble then testified regarding a second reason for the Committee's change of
position in this proceeding, that:
the [Utility] has submitted compelling testimony in evidence
showing that a combination of blending and diverting coalseam gas under [Questar Pipeline's] mainline 104 [pipeline]
for delivery into Kern River system does not entirely
eliminate the need to occasionally process coal-seam gas to
protect the safety of Questar's customers. In recent years,
either on-plant maintenance on ML 104 on [sic] [or] the
favorable market prices on the Kern River system has resulted
in significant volumes of coal-seam gas flowing to the Payson
gate and on to Questar Gas's distribution system. Therefore,
C02 processing is the most effective remedy available to

9

Id at 35-36.
11

address this situation."
Regarding Committee concerns about affiliate conflict of interest, Mr. Gimble
testified:
The Committee continues to maintain that the management of
an independent LDC [local gas distribution company or
utility] would have contested any attempt by a pipeline
company to pass along the gas management costs at issue in
this docket. While customers [sic] [Questar Corporation] paid
a very heavy price in non-recovery [of] C02 processing costs
of about $40 million, it nevertheless generated a profitable
business from transporting, gathering and storing coal-seam
gas.
The affiliate conflict issue led the Committee to conclude that
Questar would have to give up all claims to recover past C02
processing costs in any settlement package.11
After considering the evidence in the record, the Commission approved the parties'
settlement in a January 6, 2006 Commission order that concluded:
Coal bed methane is now an important part of the gas supply
purchased by Questar Gas for its customers. However, the
use of this gas creates a significant safety risk for customers
who have not adjusted their appliances to properly burn this
gas. Providing a transition period for customers to have their
appliances inspected and, if necessary, adjusted to the range
now specified in Questar Gas's tariff is reasonable both
because of the uncontested safety concerns and because
customers need additional time to complete necessary
inspections and adjustments. Given the extensive
investigation and analysis undertaken by Questar Gas, the
Division and the Committee to identify and compare

{0

Id at 36.

"Id at 37.
12

alternatives for dealing with this risk, we find that operation
of the C02 Removal Plant in accordance with the terms of the
Stipulation provides a reasonable, reliable, cost-effective
solution during the necessary transition period.
Based on the findings of fact in the foregoing sections of this
Order, we conclude that Questar Gas's use of the C02
Removal Plant from and after February 1, 2005 to manage the
heat content of its gas supplies is prudent and that the partial
recovery of costs provided in the Stipulation is reasonable and
in the public interest.12
On November 4, 2005, after the Commission proceeding was over, but before
issuance of the Commission's order, Appellants Ball and Geddes filed late public witness
statements, Record 328 and 330, that alleged lack of proper notice regarding the October
20, 2005 hearing to approve the settlement and Committee and Division failure to fulfill
their statutory duties in agreeing to the settlement. Thirteen days later, Appellants Ball
and Geddes petitioned to intervene in the concluded proceeding, Record 336, asserting
lack of notice and that important affiliate interest and prudence issues addressed in earlier
proceedings had not been properly considered by the settling parties. They requested that
the Commission hold "a full evidentiary hearing."13
The Commission denied the petition to intervene in an order issued the same day it
issued its January 6, 2006 order approving the settlement, concluding the intervention

^Commission's January 6, 2006 Order, p. 38.
13

Roger J. Ball and Claire Geddes Request to Intervene, Docket Nos. 04-057-04;
04-057-09; 04-057-11; 04-057-13; and 05-057-01, pp. 11-12. Record, 336.
13

would materially impair the interests of justice and conduct of the adjudicative
proceedings.14
February 6, 2006, Appellants Ball and Geddes and 53 other persons who are the
additional 53 Appellants in this appeal requested the Commission to reconsider its order
approving the settlement,13 and Appellants Ball and Geddes' requested the Commission to
reconsider its denial of their intervention petition.16 The Commission did not respond to
either request, making its orders approving the settlement and denying intervention final.
March 27, 2006, Mr. Ball and Ms. Geddes and the 53 other Appellants filed
separate petitions for appellate review of the Commission's order approving the

Commission's January 6, 2006 Order on Request to Intervene. Docket Nos. 04057-04; 04-057-09; 040-057-11; 04-057-13 and 05-057-01. Record 1150. The Utah
Administrative Procedures Act, Utah Code Ann.§63-46b-9 (West 2004), requires that
third party intervention be denied if the "interests of justice and the orderly and prompt
conduct of the adjudicative proceedings will be materially impaired by allowing the
intervention."
15

February 6, 2006 Request of Petitioners for Reconsideration of the Report and
Order of the PSC, Issued January 6, 2006, Approving a Gas Management Cost
Stipulation. Docket Nos. 04-057-04; 04-057-09; 04-057-11; 04-057-13 and 05-057-01.
Record, 1156. Febmary 6, 2006 Request of Petitioners Roger Ball and Claire Geddes for
Reconsideration of the Report and Order of the PSC, Issued 1/6/06, Approving a Gas
Management Cost Stipulation. Docket Nos. 04-057-04; 04-057-09; 04-057-11; 04-05703 and 05-057-01.
l6

February 6, 2006 Request of Petitioners Roger Ball and Claire Geddes for
Reconsideration of the Report and Order of the Utah PSC Issued January 6, 2006,
Denying them Intervention, Docket Nos. 04-057-04; 04-057-09; 04-057-11; 04-057-13
and 05-057-01. Record, 1159.
14

settlement. This Court, by its Order of June 5, 2006, consolidated the two petitions under
Docket No. 20060279.
3.

Statement of Facts

CBM natural gas
CBM in recent years has become a vital natural gas resource for this country and
the Rocky Mountain region in particular. According to the Utah Geological Survey:
Over the past 10 years, gas recovered from deep coal beds has become a
significant part of Utah's natural gas supply and reserves. The U.S. Energy
Information Administration reports that in 2000 coal bed gas made up about
35 percent of Utah's 4.5 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) of proven natural gas
reserves. Thus, coal bed gas, once regarded as mainly a safety hazard for
underground coal mines, has been transformed from a poorly understood
resource to a major new source of natural gas in Utah, and elsewhere in the
U.S.17
Undisputed testimony in the record of this proceeding states:
Natural gas from coals becomes more significant every day as
demand for all types of energy increases. . . .CBM currently
supplies approximately 10% of the gas used every day in the
United States.18
CBM gas has accounted for up to 40% of the Utility's annual purchased gas supply and
saved Utility customers over $36 million in fuel costs alone in recent years.19

17

Survey Notes, Utah Geological Survey, Volume 34, Number 2, June 2002, p. 12.
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Undisdputed April 15, 2005, Direct Testimony of Robert A. Lamarre, Docket
Nos. 04-057-04; 04-057-09; 04-057-11; 04-057-13; and 05-057-01, p.15. Record 279.
l9

Undisputed April 15, 2005 Direct Testimony of Utility witness Alan J.
Walker, Docket Nos. 04-057-04; 04-057-09; 04-057-11; 04-057-13 and 05-05701,p.20. Record 283.
15

Although the largest CBM production source nearest to the Utility's distribution
system continues to be the Ferron fields near Price, Utah, new production fields are
emerging in the Powder River Basin in northeastern Wyoming, and in the Washakie
Basin in south-central Wyoming. CBM from these production fields is transported to
market on the Kern River pipeline, which also delivers to Questar Gas.20
While its value is now recognized, CBM was not always so well received. During
most of the 1990s it was an unwanted nuisance in the Utility's distribution system
because its lower Btu content would not safely and efficiently burn in customers' gas
appliances that for decades had been set to burn the higher Btu-content gas streams that
were then available and constituted the Utility's gas supply.21 Even when CBM
production from the Price, Utah area began to substantially increase during the mid1990s, the future size and significance of that production was not predictable or
appreciated until at least 1998, or later.22

20

Undisputed April 15, 2005 Direct Testimony of Utility witness Robert A.
Lamarre, Docket Nos. 04-057-04; 04-057-09; 04-057-11; 04-057-13 and 05-057-01, pp.
20-22. Record 279.
21

Alan K. Allred, a Utility witness in the initial 1998 proceedings for rate recovery
of CBM gas processing costs (Docket No. 98-057-12), testified that the Utility's earlier
Btu range for its gas supply had been established "for as far back as anybody working in
the company can remember, or as far back as any records we could find." Rep. June 7,
1999 Tr. of Proceedings. Docket 98-057-12, page 75.
22

Appellants allege on pages 67-68 of their Opening Brief that "as early as the mid1990s, [Questar Gas] knew about or should have anticipated" the growth of CBM into a
major new source of gas supply. Expert testimony in the record of this proceeding, on the
other hand, shows that Price-area CBM production is now "one of the 10 largest [natural
16

CBM began entering the Utility's distribution system in the early 1990s as a result
of being transported to market in a Questar Pipeline Company pipeline that provided
interstate transport of a major portion of the Utility's gas supply. The CBM entered the
pipeline near Price, Utah, blending with the Utility's gas supply moving in that pipeline
from entry points east of Price to a delivery point near Payson where it entered the
Utility's distribution system.
This natural blending of CBM with higher Btu gas in the interstate pipeline was
sufficient to solve the problem of CBM incompatibility with Utility customers' gas
appliances until the mid-1990s, when increasing volumes of CBM entering the pipeline
began displacing, rather than blending with, the Utility's gas supply. In November 1998,
after it was clear that blending was no longer a sufficient remedy, the Utility contracted
with Questar Transportation Services Company ("Questar Transportation Services"), a
Questar Pipeline subsidiary, for CBM processing services at a C02 removal plant Questar
Transportation Services built and operates for that purpose, to remove sufficient inert
C02 from the CBM to raise the gas' heat content to a sufficient level prior to it reaching
the Utility's distribution system.

gas] discoveries made in the United States in the past 15 years," and "no one realized the
true significance of this discovery and its associated production volumes until 1998." See,
generally, the April 15, 2005 Direct Testimony of Robert A. Lamarre, Docket Nos. 04057-04; 04-057-09; 04-057-11; 04-057-13 and 05-057-01, pp.26-30. Record 279.
17

The Utility Has Changed its Regulated Gas Heat Content Range
CBM was not the only factor affecting the heat content of the Utility's gas supply.
The Btu decline which CBM caused in gas flowing to the southern sector of the Utility's
distribution system was often matched by a similar decline in gas flowing to the northern
sector of the Utility's distribution system. There the cause was recurring commercial
extraction by producers of higher Btu value gas constituents, such as ethane and propane,
from natural gas sources available to serve the northern portion of the Utility's
distribution system.23
The Utility responded to these changes in its gas supply in early 1998 by
petitioning for, and receiving, Commission approval to lower the heat content range of
the natural gas it is obligated to provide customers to a level that better corresponded to
the nature of the gas supply it believed would be available for distribution in the future.24
23

April 15, 2005 Direct Testimony of Utility witness Lawrence A. Conti, pp 26-28.
Record 246.
24

The Commission's August 30, 2004 order summarized this change in the
approved heat range for Questar Gas' gas supply as follows:
Following a series of meetings and discussions beginning in
January 1998 with the Commission, the Division of Public
Utilities (Division), and the Committee of Consumer Services
(Committee) to notify us of an imminent safety problem
associated with heat-content levels in the natural gas supplies
it was receiving from Questar Pipeline Company (Questar
Pipeline), an affiliated company, and the incompatibility of
that gas with current appliance set points, Questar Gas
Company (Questar Gas or Company ) filed Advice Letter 9802 on April 21, 1998, reducing the heat-content operating
18

The Utility at that time informed gas appliance manufacturers and local dealers and
plumbing and heating contractors of the need to adjust the customers' gas appliances they
sold or serviced to safely and efficiently burn a lower heat content gas, and initiated a
program to inform customers of the need to inspect and adjust their gas appliances as
well.25

range in its tariff from 1020 tol320 Btu per cubic foot (cf) to
980 to 1170 Btu/cf. The Division filed a memorandum on
April 30, 1998, supporting the change, and no party objected
to it. The change became effective on May 1, 1998. [August
30, 2004 Order, Docket Nos. 03-057-05; 01-057-14; 99-05720; and 98-057-12, p. 2].
255 y

Appellants incorrectly state that the Utility's program to adjust customers' gas
appliances "only recently has been launched." Appellants' Opening Brief at 17. In
response to a Commission question during the 2000 hearing in Docket No. 99-057-20
asking if the appliance adjustment program was underway, Utility witness, Alan Allred
stated:
It's been communicated to all dealers and installers, heating
plumbing contractors. They are now, should be every time
they service an appliance, every time they install a new
appliance, it should be at that set point, just as under the old
standard it should have been at the old one.
In addition to that, as Questar Gas's service technicians are in
homes doing adjustments and have time or as they get
requests from customers, they are doing that work. But
there's, you know, 100 or 50 of those people, and they have to
do all the other service work, and there's 670,000 customers.
So obviously they're not going to do all of the work in 10
years. You know, a substantial amount of it's going to have to
be done by heating and plumbing contractors as they do
replacements or as they do adjustments.
Reporters' June 23, 2000 Transcript of Proceedings, Docket No. 99-057-20, pp. 100819

In order to provide a safe and efficient gas supply to customers whose gas
appliances had been adjusted to bum a lower Btu content gas as well as customers whose
appliances had not yet adjusted, the Utility concluded it would process the CBM for a
projected ten-year 'transition period' so customers would have sufficient time to have
their appliances adjusted or replaced with new appliances adjusted by the manufacturer to
properly bum a lower-Btu range gas. The processing would remove enough inert C02 to
raise the energy content of the resulting CBM stream so it falls within the overlapping
lower end of the Utility's earlier-approved heat content range and the higher end of the
lower heat content range approved by the Commission in May 1998.26
While the Utility's initial applications to the Commission for rate recovery of
CBM processing costs were finally denied by the Commission's August 2004 Order [See
Section 2, Course of Proceedings, above], that same order recognized the need for a
"long-term solution to the compatibility of customer appliances with natural gas
containing coal-seam gas consistent with the utility's obligation to provide safe

1009.
26

In another critical error, Appellants assert that had the Utility initiated its
program to adjust customers' gas appliances earlier, "it would have avoided imposing the
double burden of this charge/?/^ the added expense of gas processing" thereby "sav[ing]
ratepayers millions in processing costs." Appellants' Opening Brief at 27-28, 30, 34, 43.
Undisputed testimony in the record of this proceeding makes clear that CBM gas
processing would be required as a transitional remedy once the program of adjusting
customers' gas appliances began - no matter when the program began. [Direct
Testimony of Lawrence A. Conti, April 15, 2005, Docket Nos. 04-057-04; 045-057-4)9;
04-057-11; 04-057-13; and 05-057-01, pp,. 36-37. Record 246.
20

commodity and service to its customers," and stated the Commission would open a
docket to further address that need.
In October 2004, the Commission accordingly initiated and chaired a series of six
technical conferences for regulatory parties, the Utility, and other interested parties to
better understand and craft a long-term solution to the Utility's CBM incompatibility
problem. The final technical conference included an in-depth review of three preferred
solutions for managing heat content:
1.

precision blending with CBM processing as emergency back-up;

2.

precision blending with Kern River pipeline gas as emergency back-up; and

3.

continued CBM processing with propane injection as emergency back-up.28

After this regulatory process was concluded, the Utility decided to continue to manage
the heat content of its gas supply by processing the CBM under its existing affiliate
contract for processing services rather than resorting to some other remedy option. It
applied for rate recovery of the resulting costs in this proceeding.
In subsequent negotiations and settlement between the Utility and the other
participating parties, the Utility waived any claim to rate recovery of CBM processing
costs incurred prior to February 1, 2005 in exchange for rate recovery thereafter in
accordance with the settlement terms.

^Commission's August 2004 Order, p. 50.
28

The content of the six technical conferences is discussed in detail on pages 17-24
of the Commission's January 6, 2006 Order.
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SUMMARY

OFARGUMENT

The Parties to this proceeding reached a comprehensive settlement that fairly
resolves a long-standing and technically complex dispute. Relevant and probative
evidence in the record of this proceeding shows that the settlement is in the public
interest; is in the interest of Utility ratepayers who are entitled to reasonable, safe and
efficient natural gas service;29 and accords, in every respect, with Utah law that
"encourage[s]" settlement by the parties of matters before the Commission."30
The Appellants, none of whom chose to participate in the informing technical
conference process or the eight-month Commission proceeding, seek to undo the outcome
of that intensive process and restore the status quo ante for reasons that no longer pertain.
Such a result would waste state and ratepayer money in a further dispute that litigation
has shown itself ill-equipped to finally resolve.
The Appellants' ill-conceived objective and arguments disregard the most
important question in this proceeding: How do we best protect ratepayers' interests in the
face of a changing regional and national natural gas supply? They never address the
29

Utah Code Ann. §54-3-1 states, in part:
Every public utility shall furnish, provide and maintain such
service, instrumentalities, equipment and facilities as will
promote the safety, health, comfort and convenience of its
patrons, employees and the public, and as will be in all
respects adequate, efficient, just and reasonable.

30

Utah Code Ann. §54-7-1.
22

changes that have occurred, or are foreseen but have yet to occur, in the gas supply
available to Utility customers.31 They never mention the 1998 Commission-approved
decision to lower the Btu range of the gas supply the Utility manages for customers to
accommodate those known or foreseeable changes. And they never offer any workable
alternative to the Utility's decision to accommodate the transition to that lower-Btu range
gas supply by continuing to process CBM
The Appellants' implicit solution to the CBM incompatibility problem is for the
Utility to further provide processing at no cost to ratepayers or to find some other remedy.
The facts in the record of this proceeding show that neither option would lead to just and
reasonable rates32 and both would encourage further litigation, since the Utility would be
denied rate recovery of the remedy shown to be most efficacious and cost efficient in

31

The April 15, 2005 Direct Testimony of Utility witness, Lawrence A. Conti, in
the record of this proceeding, pp. 33-36, Record 246, discusses these changes. The only
mention Appellants make of these changes is a one-sentence argumentative comment on
pages 50-51, and a further short paragraph comment on page 67 of their Opening Brief.
32

Regarding the meaning of the phrase "just and reasonable rates," this Court, in
discussing an earlier reference to a "trust relationship"between a public utility and its
customers, stated in Utah Dept. of Admin. Serv. v. Pub. Serv. Comm 'n, 658 P.2d 601, 618
(Utah 1983):
That statement [about a trust relationship] . . . is simply an
expression of the utility's legal responsibility to make "just
and reasonable" charges for its services and to assure that
those services are "in all respects adequate, efficient, just and
reasonable." U.C.A., 1953, § 54-3-1.

23

managing the heat content of its gas supply through the transition period.
The Appellants' legal arguments for undoing the parties' settlement in this case are
as misplaced as their objective. The case law they cite to support their argument that the
Commission's August 2004 Order is dispositive of the issues of prudence and rate
recovery in this proceeding make clear that prior Commission Order has no relevance in
this proceeding at all Moreover, the wording of the order limits its application to rate
recovery of CBM processing costs for the time period of June 1999 through May 2004.
The Appellants compound their legal error by misreading the wording of Utah
Code §54-4-4(4)(a) that identifies the Utility "action" or decision the Commission must
consider when determining the prudence of costs sought to be included in rates. That
"action" is not the 1998 decision to build the C02 removal plant, as Appellants assert.
That "action" is the Utility's decision to continue CBM processing by means of its
affiliate service contract.
The Appellants' claims, that they were denied an adequate opportunity to be heard
and that Commission Chairman Campbell was biased and should have recused himself
from this proceeding, have no merit. In denying Appellants Ball and Geddes untimely
petition to intervene, the Commission effectively determined that Appellants' lack of
participation in this proceeding stems not from a lack of proper notice but rather from
their failure to become informed and to make their concerns known in a timely fashion.
Regarding Chairman Campbell's alleged bias, they have effectively waived that claim by
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not timely raising it - a claim they in any case have failed to establish.
Finally, the Appellants have failed to demonstrate that they have standing to
challenge the Commission's approval of the parties' settlement on appeal. There is
presently pending before this Court motions to dismiss the Appellants' consolidated
appeals for lack of standing or other authority, and those motions should be granted by
this Court.
ARGUMENT
L

THE APPELLANTS SHOULD NOT BE GRANTED STANDING
TO CHALLENGE THE SETTLEMENT THE PARTICIPATING
AND INFORMED PARTIES REACHED IN THIS PROCEEDING-

The two principal Appellants in this case, Mr. Ball and Ms. Geddes, petitioned to
intervene in this proceeding after it was over, asserting lack of notice, that the Committee
and the Division had failed to perform their "statutory duty," and that "the Commission
has not heard from any party in this matter who had competently, effectively, thoroughly,
professionally or vigorously represented the potential impact of [Questar Gas']
Application on its customers." They requested that the Commission grant them full
discovery rights, the right to submit testimony and cross-examine witnesses, and that the
Commission hold another "full evidentiary hearing."33
The Commission denied Appellants Ball and Geddes intervention petition. It
found they had "provid[ed] no explanation for not being aware of these proceedings"

"November 17, 2005 Request to Intervene, Docket Nos. 04-057-04; 04-057-09;
04-057-11; 04-057-13 and 05-057-01, at 9 and 10-12. Record 336.
25

despite "[a]ll requirements of the Open and Public Meetings Act [being] met," and further
information about the proceeding being provided on the Commission's "publicly
accessible website containing notices and orders"and which further "permits a person to
request their inclusion on docket specific mailing lists."34 The Commission concluded:
The Petitioners' ability or inability to participate in these
dockets is of their own making. They give no creditable
explanation for why they delayed seeking intervention until
after the end of our proceedings, especially when they were
aware of, or should have been aware of, Questar's request for
recovery of C02 plant expenses. Questar's specific
arguments and evidentiary basis upon which it sought
recoveiy was available for months, without question
beginning with the filing of the January 2005 Application and
Questar's April 2005 testimony.3^
The Commission found Petitioners' claim that the Committee and the Division had
not properly represented ratepayers and the public interest completely unsubstantiated:
In summary, while Petitioner's legal interests may be affected
by these proceedings (as indeed may the interests of the other
hundreds of thousands of Questar customers), those interests
have been vigorously protected by those statutorily charged
with the task; namely the Committee, the Division and their
respective experts.36

^Commission's January 56, 2006 Order on Request to Intervene, Docket Nos. 04057-04; 04-057-09; 04-057-11; 04-057-13; and 05-057-01, at 6-7. Record 1150.
^Commission's January 56, 2006 Order on Request to Intervene, at 13.
36

Id. at 14.
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Referring to the requirements of Utah Code Ann §63-46-9, that permits interested
third party intervention in an administrative adjudicatory proceeding where its is shown
that:
the interests of justice and the orderly and prompt conduct of
the adjudicative proceedings will not be materially impaired
by allowing the intervention,37
the Commission concluded:
[i]n view of the substantial efforts and expenditures of time
and money incurred by all of the parties in this case,
reopening this case at this late date to provide additional time
permitting Petitioners to go on a fishing expedition.. .is
contrary to public policy which encourages resolution by
negotiated stipulation... .There has been extensive
investigation of why it may be or why it may not be
appropriate and prudent to utilize the C02 plant for
circumstances as they now are or are expected to be for
Questar and its customers. . . . Appropriate notices for all of
the Commission's technical conferences and docket
proceedings have been given; the Commission has complied
with the requirements of Utah law. .. . The Commission has
conducted an evidentiary hearing to receive evidence to
resolve the matter. Other public witnesses were aware of that
hearing's scheduling and the time set for it; they appeared and
provided their statements to the Commission. Petitioners
have been provided the opportunity to submit written
statements, they have submitted them and they have been
considered by the Commission.... We are unpersuaded by
Petitioners' arguments that their intervention at this stage is
necessary, can be done without violating Utah Code §63-46b9fs touchstones regarding impairment of the interests of
justice and the orderly and prompt conduct of proceedings,
nor without setting a debilitating intervention precedent...
Wherefore, it is hereby ORDERED that Roger Ball's and

Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-9(2)(b) (2001).
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Clair Geddess' Petition to Intervene is denied.38
If Ball's and Geddes' participation was untimely and impairing of the interests of
justice prior to appeal, neither they nor the other 53 Appellants have provided any new
evidence or compelling reason that would allow one to conclude that Appellants'
participation at this even later stage in the proceeding would be any more salutary, any
less impairing of the interests of justice, or any less of a "debilitating... precedent."39
There is pending before this Court a May 2, 2006 Motion to Dismiss that was filed
by the Utility in response to the Appellants' March 27, 2006 Petition for Review. In a
June 5, 2006 Order, this Court deferred ruling on that motion, stating it would consider
the matter upon full briefing and oral argument. The Committee supports and adopts the
argument and conclusions in the Utility's pending motion and urges the Court to grant the
motion and dismiss this appeal.
II.

NEITHER THE COMMISSION'S AUGUST 2004 ORDER
NOR THE FACTUAL CIRCUMSTANCES THAT ORDER
IS BASED ON GOVERN THE DETERMINATION OF
PRUDENCE OR RATE RECOVERY IN THIS PROCEEDING.

The lack of merit in Appellants' appeal does not rest solely with their failure to
timely participate in the Commission proceeding or their lack of standing to appeal the
outcome of that proceeding to this Court. Even if they had participated in the proceeding
and even if they had standing to appeal, the arguments in their Opening Brief for why this

"Id at 14-15.
'9Id at 15.
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Court should undo the settlement the parties reached in this case are legally flawed and
without merit.
A.

The Wording and Intent of the Commission Js August 2004 Order
Limits its Application to the CBM Processing Costs at Issue in that Case.
Much of the Appellants' argument in this appeal is based on a lack of

understanding of the record and Commission findings in earlier proceedings. For
example, their Opening Brief asserts that the Commission's August 2004 Order resolves
the issue of rate recovery of CBM processing expenses in this proceeding, yet the order's
wording limits its application to the record facts and costs at issue in that case:
For the reasons set forth above, we conclude that Questar Gas
has not met the burden of proving its actions constituted a
prudent response to the introduction of lower Btu coal-seam
gas into the Questar Gas distribution system.. .We therefore
reject the C02 Stipulation and deny recovery of the
processing costs during the period from June 1999 to May
2004.40
The Commission further emphasizes the order's limited applicability in a response it
made to a Utility request for clarification of that very point:
The [August 2004 Order] addressed only Questar's failure to
substantiate approval of the C02 Stipulation in these
proceedings and our necessary rejection of the Stipulation,
which would have permitted recovery of some processing
costs through May of 2004. Our reference to the May 2004
end date was dictated by the Stipulation's terms and was not
intended to have any other preclusive effect on recovery by
Questar. In regards to Questar's request for clarification and
reconsideration, we state that our Order does not preclude

'Commission's August 2004 Order, p. 49.
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Questar from seeking recovery of C02 processing costs in
other dockets A{
The factual and time limitations to the Commission's August 2004 Order are not
surprising. It draws upon a factual record that had already been closed four years earlier,
and by the time it was issued the circumstances regarding CBM's presence in the utilities
distribution system were changing.
The Commission calls attention to these changes and their import in its
unambiguous notice at the end of the August 2004 Order. After stating it would
determine the disposition of monies already collected in rates for CBM processing during
June 1999 through May 2004 in a separate proceeding, the Commission concluded:
We will also address, in a separate docket, how to craft a
long-term solution to the compatibility of customer appliances
with natural gas containing coal-seam gas consistent with the
utility's obligation to provide safe commodity and service to
its customers.42

^Commission's October 20, 2004 Order on Request for Reconsideration and
Clarification, Docket Nos. 98-057-12; 99-057-20, 01-057-14 and 03-057-05, p. 4
(emphasis added). On page 48 of their Opening Brief, Appellants attempt to minimize
the Commission's clarification by arguing the Commission simply "declined to pre-judge
issues or to give an advisory opinion of matters not before it." Nevertheless, had the
Commission intended that its order be binding in other proceedings, its clarification, that
the order "was not intended to have any other preclusive effect on recovery by Questar,"
is obviously inaccurate and misleading. A much more reasonable interpretation of the
clarification is the Order was intended to only apply to the facts and costs at issue in that
proceeding.
42

Commission's August 2004 Order, p. 50.
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The proceedings referred to in this notice were the six technical conferences the
Commission chaired that, in turn, led to this proceeding.
Putting Appellants' res judicata claims aside for the moment, a simple reading of
the August 2004 Order demonstrates the error in their argument. The August 2004 Order
does not govern in this proceeding because it was never intended to govern, and its
wording so states.
B.

The Commission Js August 2004 Order Has no
Res Judicata or Precedential Application in this Case.
Even if the wording of the Commission's August 2004 Order did not preclude its

application in this instance, the case law the Appellants cite to support their res judicata
argument clearly does. That case law distinguishes rate case proceedings such as this one
from the usual application of that doctrine of repose and further states that differing
factual circumstances, such as those that distinguish this proceeding, preclude the
application of the August 2004 Order to the rate recovery issues in this case.
The Commission's January 6, 2006 Order properly recognized the changed
circumstances in the record of this proceeding and concluded:
In considering the prudence of Questar Gas's decision to use
the C02 Removal Plant to manage the heat content of its gas
supplies since February 1, 2005, we must consider the facts
and conditions as they existed at that time. Our prior finding
that the Company failed to demonstrate prudence in its
decision to contract for construction and operation of the C02
Removal Plant during the 1997 and 1998 time frame is
relevant only to the extent the same conditions present in
1997 and 1998 continue to be present Based on the evidence
31

presented in these dockets, it is apparent these conditions
have changed [emphasis added].43
The Commission goes on to recount how the record circumstances in this case markedly
differ from those in the record of the earlier proceedings: (1) There was a "lack of
documentation" of the Utility's decision-making process in the earlier proceedings;44
however, in this case the Utility "conducted a transparent decision-making process" that
"employed reasonable methods and criteria in evaluating alternatives, and adequately
recorded and documented its evaluation" and "carefully considered potential conflicts
between affiliates and placed the interests of its customers before those of its affiliates."45
(2) In the earlier proceedings the Commission determined the presence of CBM gas
"could have been the result of Questar Pipeline taking advantage of a business
opportunity to transport that gas," and the Utility "analysis of possible solutions appeared
to be influenced by affiliate considerations;"46 however, in this case Utility "customers
have benefitted from the shipment of coal bed methane by Questar Pipeline," and "[t]he
amount of coal bed methane on the interstate pipeline system is increasing and represents
an increasingly important source of gas to meet growing customer demands as traditional

^Commission's January 6, 2006 Order, p. 33 (emphasis added).
44

Id at 33.

45

Id. at 37. Record Documents 104 through 213 illustrate the "transparent" process
the Commission refers to.
46

Id at 33.
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gas supplies decline."47 (3) In the earlier proceeding the Commission was "troubled by
the fact that the contract for operation of the C02 Removal Plant was given to an
unregulated affiliate of Questar Gas;48 however, in this case
the record also establishes that having the C02 Removal Plant
owned and operated by Questar Transportation does not result
in any prejudice to Questar Gas or its customers [since] the
costs incurred by Questar Gas are the same as if the plant
were owned and operated by Questar Gas.49
(4) In the earlier proceeding the Commission concluded the Utility "should have
anticipated the safety issue earlier than it did, which may have allowed more time to
"address the issue and pursue other alternatives, such as . . . action by Questar Gas at the
FERC;"50 however, in this case
[n]o Party believes it would be reasonable to pursue actions at
the FERC to attempt to keep coal bed methane off of Questar
Pipeline. Indeed, it appears that pursuing such actions would
be detrimental to Questar Gas customers. Therefore, the fact
that Questar Gas did not pursue these potential actions prior to

47

Id. at 34. See, April 15, 2005 Direct Testimony of Robert A. Lamarre, Record
279, at 12-28, on CBM as a vital gas supply resource; and April 15 Direct Testimony of
Alan J. Walker, Record 283, at 4 and 10-23, on financial savings that have accrued to
Utility ratepayers as a result of the availability of CBM.
48

/</. at33.

49

Id at 34. See, April 15, 2005 Direct Testimony of Barrie L. McKay, Record 234,
at 27-28, stating, in part: "a prudent utility would attempt to negotiate a contract with its
affiliate that costs no more than it could provide the service itself. Questar Gas has done
so. Given this, it would be of no benefit for Questar Gas to pursue ownership of the
plant."
50

Mat33.
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1999, which gave rise to concerns about affiliate conflicts in
prior proceedings, does not give rise to the same concerns in
the current contexts l
The Appellants rely on the Utah case of Salt Lake Citizens v. Mountain States
Telephone, 846 P.2d 1245, 1252-53 (Utah 1992) for their res judicata argument, but that
case actually supports the Commission's conclusion that its August 2004 Order does not
govern the issues of prudence and rate recovery in this case. This Court observed in Salt
Lake Citizens that res judicata
has only limited applicability to agency proceedings, such as
rate cases where the predominant issue is what constitutes a
just and reasonable rate for a future period. What constitutes a
just and reasonable rate of return, the cost of capital, and the
various expenses and revenue amounts cannot be decided on
the basis of a prior rate proceeding but must be determined
anew in each rate case.^2
This Court then identifies the circumstances where res judicata may apply, which only
further demonstrates the inapplicability of that legal doctrine in this instance:
Res judicata applies when there has been a prior adjudication
of a factual issue and an application of a rule of law to those
facts. In other words, res judicata bars a second adjudication
of the same facts under the same rule of law. ^3

5{

Id. at 35. See, April 15, 2005 Direct Testimony of Alan J. Walker, Record 283, at
24-25, stating, in part, that "any effort to keep CBM off of Questar Pipeline would have
been ill-advised because it would have resulted in proceedings at FERC where other
shippers would have attempted to keep [Utility]-owned gas off of Questar Pipeline unless
it was processed to remove hydrocarbon liquids."
52

Salt Lake Citizens, 846 P.2d at 1251 (citation omitted).

53

Id at 1251-52.
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Were this proceeding about the prudence and rate recovery of the Utility's June
1999 through May 2004 CBM gas processing costs that were at issue in the August 2004
Order, the Appellants' claim ofres judicata would be relevant. Since, however, this
proceeding is about different costs, incurred as a result of a different decision and under
different circumstances, Salt Lake Citizens makes clear the Commission's August 2004
Order has no res judicata application to the present controversy at all.
Salt Lake Citizens further shows that the Commission's August 2004 Order is also
not controlling of the issues of prudence and rate recovery in this case under established
rules of case precedent. Noting that case precedent or stare decisis also "has limited
applicability to administrative agency cases,"54 this Court states that u[r]ules of law
developed in the context of adjudication are as binding as those promulgated by agency
rule making," but
[tjhat does not mean, however, that a rule of law established
in adjudication can never be changed by the agency that
established it. Administrative agencies must, and do, have the
power to overrule a prior decision when there is a reasonable
basis for doing so. As this Court stated in Reaveley v. Public
Service Commission, 20 Utah 2d 237, 242, 436 P.2d 797, 800
(1968), "Certainly an administrative agency which has a duty
to protect the public interest ought not be precluded from
improving its collective mind should it find that a prior
decision is not now in accordance with its present idea of
what the public interest requires."55

[

Id at 1252.

'Id. at 1253 (emphasis added).
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In other words, even //the Commission's August 2004 Order indicated it was
applicable to other proceedings (which, as discussed above, it does not), the Commission
has the power to overrule that order "where there is a reasonable basis for doing so."^6
The Commission's January 6, 2006 Order detailed the substantial factual changes that
have occurred since its August 2004 Order and why those changed circumstances make
the August 2004 Order no longer applicable to the issues in this case. As this Court in the
instant case explains, those enumerated changed conditions would also constitute a
reasonable basis for "overruling" the application of its August 2004 Order were there any
reason to conclude that order was intended to govern this rate proceedings. Either way, it
should be clear that the August 2004 Order is not determinative of the issues of prudence
or rate recovery in this case.
In summary, the Commission's August 2004 Order does not determine the
outcome of the issues of prudence and rate recovery in this proceeding either under the
doctrine of res judicata or under case precedential rules.
C.

The Commission Properly Judged the Prudence of the Costs
at Issue in this Proceeding by Considering the Utility Action
that Led to those Costs in Light of the Circumstances that
Existed at the Time the Action was Taken.
The Appellants argue that even if their res judicata argument is not valid the

prudence of the CBM processing costs at issue in this proceeding must nevertheless be
56

Utah Code Ann. §54-7-13 gives the Commission the express power to: "at any
time, upon notice to the public utility affected and after opportunity to be heard, rescind,
alter, or amend any order or decision made by it."
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determined by reference to the circumstances in the record that the Commission's August
2004 Order is based on.
Their argument raises the logical quandary of how the law could require
application of past differing facts to a subsequent case when the doctrine of res judicata
makes those past differing facts and the decision based on those facts inapplicable. The
law resolves the quandary by affirming the correctness of the Commission's prudence
determination.
The procedure the Commission is to follow in making a prudence determination,
and the circumstances it is to consider, are codified in the Utah law the Appellants cite
but misapply. Utah Code Ann. §54-4-4(4)(a) (2001) provides:
If, in the commission's determination of just, reasonable, or
sufficient rates, the commission considers the prudence of an
action taken by a public utility, or an expense incurred by a
public utility, the commission shall apply the following
standards in making its prudence determination:
(i) ensure just and reasonable rates for the retail
ratepayers of the public utility in this state;
(ii) focus on the reasonableness of the expense
resulting from the action of the public utility judged as
of the time the action was taken;
(iii) determine whether a reasonable utility, knowing
what the utility knew or reasonably should have
known, at the time of the action, would reasonably
have incurred all or some portion of the expense, in
taking the same or some other prudent action; and
(iv) apply other factors determined by the commission
37

to be relevant, consistent with the standards specified
in this section.
The Appellants argue this statutory wording requires that the Commission
determine the prudence of the CBM processing costs at issue by considering the
circumstances back in 1998, or earlier, when the C02 removal plant was constructed. For
them, the prudence issue is whether the decision to build the processing plant and its
ensuing cost were reasonable.57
The problem with the Appellants' argument is the Utility is not asking for rate
recovery of the costs to construct the C02 removal plant, and never has. It does not even
own the plant: Questar Transportation Services owns and operates the plant. If the utility
owned it, it would not merely be seeking recovery of plant processing costs; it would be
seeking approval to include the capital cost of the plant in rate base upon which it would
then be entitled to earn a return on investment.
If the Commission, as per the statutory wording, is to "focus on the reasonableness
of the expense resulting from the action of the public utility," the expense must be the
57

The Appellants' Opening Brief states on page 54: "Questar Gas had a full and
fair opportunity to show prudence in connection with the Plant construction in hearings
before the Commission from 1998 to 2004." On page 60 it states: "Questar Gas and the
Division (now joined by the Committee) again seek recovery of a portion of the costs
associated with the C02 Plant."On page 63 it states: "The Commission's faulty
justification for endorsing gas processing costs for the period after January 31, 2005 even though the Plant construction in 1998 which gave rise to these costs was deemed
imprudent and even illegal by a formal adjudication in August of 2004 - is illustrated by
the following hypothetical.. ." On page 66 it states: [tjhe decision under review in this
case was Questar's determination to build the Plant in its affiliate, Questar
Transportation."
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CBM processing services expense. And, since the only CBM processing services
expense under consideration for rate recovery in this proceeding is CBM processing
services expense incurred on or after February 1, 2005,58 the essential task becomes one
of identifying the Utility "action" that uresult[ed]" in that particular "expense."
This is precisely the task the Commission went through in its prudence evaluation.
It stated in its January 6, 2006 Order:
We need not assess the prudence of the Company's actions
prior to February I, 2005 since, pursuant to the Stipulation,
the Company has agreed to forego request of any cost
recovery prior to this date?9
It then identified the Utility decision-making process that resulted in the post-January 31,

58

Paragraph 9 of the settlement provides:
The Parties agree that Questar Gas should be granted cost
recovery as provided below:
(a)

Past Costs. If this Stipulation is approved in a final
order and Questar Gas actually receives the recovery
contemplated in paragraph 9(c), Questar Gas will not
seek recovery of approximately $15 million of past gas
management costs incurred from January 1, 2003
through January 31, 2005.

(b)

Cost Recovery beginning February L 2005. Rate
recovery shall be allowed for costs incurred after
January 31, 2005, pursuant to the terms of this
Stipulation.. . .

October 7, 2005 Gas Management Cost Stipulation, docket Nos. 04-057-04;
04-057-09; 04-07-11; 04-057-13 and 05-057-01, Record 322.
^Commission's January 6, 2005 Order, p. 28, Footnote 13.
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2005 CBM processing expense in the following finding:
The Company conducted a transparent decision-making
process open to the public and subject to scrutiny by any
interested person. Throughout the technical conference
process, Questar Gas repeatedly sought input from other
parties on how to best address the issues presented by the
presence of coal bed methane going forward. No participant
challenged the conclusions Questar Gas presented as being
prudent and in the best interests of customers, and no
participant suggested any alternative as more preferable.
Questar Gas clearly identified its objective to address the
safety issue posed by the presence of coal bed methane on its
system. The Company identified alternatives to meet this
objective, employed reasonable methods and criteria in
evaluating the alternatives, and adequately recorded and
documented its evaluation. The company carefully
considered potential conflicts between affiliates and placed
the interests of its customers before those of its affiliates.
This process satisfies the concerns outlined in our 2004
Order. We therefore conclude that a reasonable, unaffiliated
utility, knowing what Questar Gas knew or reasonably should
have known, could reasonably have acted the way Questar
Gas has acted in choosing to use the C02 Removal Plant
since February 2005 and thereafter.60
In contrast to this Commission finding, further amplified by seven pages
describing the structure and content of the "transparent" decision-making process in the
Background section of its Order, and a further three pages in the Discussion, Findings and
Conclusion section of its Order,61 the Appellants devote but six lines of disparaging

^Commission's January 6, 2006 Order, pp. 37-38.
^Commission's January 6, 2006 Order, pp. 17-24 and pp. 35-38.
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comment in a 100-page brief to that process. Reflecting more than anything else their
absence from the process, they assert:
These technical conferences were used by the Utility to
instruct, not only on the issues of appliance adjustment, but
also on considerations of "prudence" in connection with
ongoing costs for gas processing.62
Beyond this unsubstantiated observation, the Appellants never address the Commission's
reasoning and findings regarding the substance and accomplishments of the technical
conference process.
The Appellants' misapplication of the statutory wording of Section 54-4-4(4)(a) is
flawed for reasons other than their failure to correctly identify the Utility action or
decision to be evaluated. A fundamental requirement that must be met in any rate making
proceeding is a "just and reasonable rates" result.63 This requirement is, in fact, expressly
stated in the statutory wording. In subsection 54-4-4(4)(a), just prior to the wording the
Appellants focus on, it states:
(a).. . the Commission shall apply the following standards in
making its prudence determination:
(i) ensure just and reasonable rates for the retail
ratepayers of the public utility in this s t a t e ; . . . .
The Appellants' misapplication of the wording in sub-section (ii), that identifies

62

Appellants' Opening Brief, pp. 49-50.

63

Utah Code Ann. §54-3-1 states: "All charges made, demanded or received by any
public utility... shall be just and reasonable."
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the proper Utility ''action," would result in unjust and unreasonable rates because it would
either disallow rate recovery of reasonably-incurred Utility operating costs or it would
force the Utility to pursue less sure and more costly remedies that, if allowed into rates,
would, by definition, not result in just and reasonable rates.
D.

Neither Utah Code Section 54-4-26 nor the 1994 Planning
Standards Proscribe Rate Recovery ofCBM Gas Processing
Costs Incurred after February L 2005.
The Appellants further argue in their Opening Brief that a combination of the

wording of Section 54-4-26 and provisions in the 1994 Final Standards and Guidelines
for Integrated Resource Planning for the Utility ("IRP Standards and Guidelines")
proscribe any rate recovery of CBM processing costs.
Section 54-4-26 provides, with emphasis added:
Every public utility, when ordered by the commission shall,
before entering into any contract for construction work or for
the purchase of new facilities or with respect to any other
expenditures, submit such proposed contract purchase or
other expenditure to the commission for its approval; and, if
the commission finds that any such proposed contract,
purchase or other expenditure diverts, directly or indirectly,
the funds of such public utility to any of the officers or
stockholders or to any corporation in which they are
interested, or is not proposed in good faith for the economic
benefit of such public utility, the commission shall withhold
its approval of such contract, purchase or other expenditure,
and may order other contracts, purchases or expenditures in
lieu thereof for the legitimate purposes and economic welfare
of such public utility.
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While this statutory wording provides the Commission discretionary authority to
pre-approve Utility expenditures, the Appellants argue that a statement the Commission
made in the IRP Standards and Guidelines convert the discretionary wording of the
statute into mandatory wording that obligates the Commission to pre-approve all Utility
affiliate contracts and expenditures.
Before turning to the IRP Standards and Guidelines statement the Appellants rely
upon, one might well question why the Commission would want to restrict its function in
such a manner. The statutory wording already empowers it to require pre-approval when
deemed necessary or appropriate. Why would it require itself to become immersed in the
minutiae of reviewing and pre-approving all Utility affiliate transactions? Beyond the
burden, such a requirement would put the Commission in the business of managing the
operations of the Utility, which is a contrary to regulatory law principles.64
Fortunately, the Commission comment the Appellants rely upon neither implies
nor requires such a result. It states:
Affiliate relations remain a concern of this Commission. We
do not presume that affiliate transactions are biased and not in
the customers' best interests. However, the Commission puts
the Company on notice that with regard to cost recovery of
64

See, Missouri ex rel Southwestern Bell Tel Co, v. Public Serv. Comm Vz, 262
U.S. 276, 289 (1923), that "[t]he Commission is not the financial manager of the
corporation, and it is not empowered to substitute its judgment for that of the directors of
the corporation.. . ."' See also, Utah Dept. of Admin. Serv. v. Pub. Serv. Comm Vi, 658
P.2d 601, 618 (Utah 1983), that "the Commission is normally forbidden from intruding
into the management of a utility,"citingZ,ogaft City v. Public Utii Comm Vz, 296 P. 1006,
1008 (Utah 1931).
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[the Utility's] expenditures, we will view [the Utility's]
customers' interests as primary. Such interests shall not be
subordinated to those of corporate affiliates. All planning
options that potentially benefit [the Utility's] ratepayers shall
be investigated, whether or not they benefit subsidiaries of the
Questar Corporation [IRP Standards and Guidelines, pp.3-4].
Without in any way minimizing the importance of the regulatory concern with affiliate
transactions, this Commission comment does not state - as the Appellants assert - that
"all affiliate transactions" or contracts will be investigated. Instead, it states "[a] 11
planning options that potentially benefit [the Utility's] ratepayers shall be investigated,
whether or not they benefit subsidiaries of the Questar Corporation."
The Commission here is talking about the Utility's IRP, which is long-range
business planning that was not implemented merely to address "the development of
conflicts of interest among the Questar constellation of corporate entities."65 The
Commission implemented IRP for Utah's major electric utility at the same time,66 and
the purpose for such planning is
to insure that the Company's present and future customers are
provided natural gas energy services at the lowest cost
consistent with safe and reliable service, and the fiscal
requirements of a financially healthy utility and the long-run
public interest. To this end, the Commission desires a
regulatory environment that encourages [the Utility] to
actively pursue its IRP as part of the Company's business

65

Appellants' Opening Brief, at 22.

^Commission's December 16, 1991 Order on Draft Standards and Guidelines for
IRP, Docket No. 91-057-09, p. 3.
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strategy.
In summary, there is nothing in the wording of Section 54-4-26 that requires
Commission pre-approval of the Utility's affiliate contract for CBM gas processing
services. Moreover, there is nothing in the Commission's IRP Standards and Guidelines
statement that would convert the discretionary pre-approval wording of the statute into a
mandatory pre-approval requirement.68
III.

A.

THE PARTIES5 SETTLEMENT IS JUST AND REASONABLE AND
SHOULD BE UPHELD UNDER UTAH LAW THAT ENCOURAGES
SETTLEMENT OF MATTERS IN DISPUTE BEFORE THE
COMMISSION.

The Settlement Represents a Reasonable Compromise of Comflicting Party
Positions regarding Complex Historical and Technical Issues.
The settlement of a complex dispute usually requires a willingness by the parties to

compromise positions in exchange for the greater benefit of a certain and sure end to the
litigation. The more complex the legal or technical issue, generally the more costly and
time-consuming the litigation and, generally, the more uncertain the ultimate outcome.
The law, for these reasons, generally favors settlements. Utah law has codified

61

Id atl-2.

68

A final observation: the Utility's affiliate contract for CBM processing services
was submitted to the Commission for approval in connection with the Utility's original
1998 application for rate recovery of CBM gas processing expenses (Docket No. 98-05712). While never formally approved or dis-approved, the contract was made a part of the
record that ultimately culminated in the Commission's August 2004 Order denying rate
recovery of CBM gas processing expenses. A perusal of that record will reveal the
contract was the subject of considerable review by the Commission and regulatory parties
in those earlier proceedings.
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that preference with regard to disputes that come before the Commission. Utah Code
Ann. §54-7-1(1) provides:
Informal resolution, by agreement of the parties, of matters
before the commission is encouraged as a
means to:
(a) resolve disputes while minimizing the time and expense
that is expended by:
(i) public utilities
(ii) the state; and
(iii) consumers;
(b) enhance administrative efficiency; or
(c) Enhance the regulatory process by allowing the
commission to concentrate on those issues that adverse
parties cannot otherwise resolve.
The parties were able to settle this case by allowing the Utility a mutuallyagreeable level of rate recovery for CBM processing costs without expressly delineating
when or how alleged past Utility prudence or imprudence occurred or ceased in a
historical time line that saw CBM grow and change from an unwanted nuisance into a
valuable natural gas resource. This is not to say, however, that regulatory concern about
the relationship between the Utility and its Questar affiliates was neglected or is not
reflected in the settlement terms. Appellants' assertions that regulatory parties abandoned
their affiliate interest concerns in settling is no more accurate than the reverse assertion
would be that the Utility abandoned its interest in rate recovery by settling.
The parties' settlement affirms the $29 million the Utility lost in earlier
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proceedings for its failure to demonstrate its CBM processing remedy was not unduly
influenced by affiliate interests. In addition, it assesses a further $7 million loss for that
failure by allowing rate recovery of CBM processing costs to not begin prior to February
1,2005.
In summary, the settlement at issue underscores regulatory parties' affiliate
concerns by the further loss of rate recovery that is embodied in the settlement. At the
same time, however, the settlement accommodates the reality that CBM gas is now a
valuable customer resource and, therefore, the Utility should, at some point, be allowed to
recover costs it reasonably incurs in securing and making that resource available to
ratepayers.
Give the prior history of this dispute, there is no credible reason to think further
litigation would achieve a more just and reasonable result for either side than what has
been achieved in the parties' settlement. The settlement, therefore, exemplifies the
benefits and fulfills the purposes set out in Utah Code Ann. §54-7-1(1), and for that
reason should be affirmed by this Court.
B.

The Record in this Proceeding Supports the Commission's
Determination that the Costs at Issue Were Prudently Incurred
and Result in Just and Resonable Rates.
The statutory law cited above that encourages the settlement of disputes before the

Commission provides that the Commission may "adopt" a settlement if:
(A) the commission finds that the settlement proposal is just
and reasonable in result; and
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(B) the evidence, contained in the record, supports a finding
that the settlement proposal is just and reasonable in result.69
In other words, the standard the Commission must use in considering the adoption of a
settlement is no different than the standard it otherwise uses in setting rates: the result
and/or the rate must be "just and reasonable."70
The Commission's January 6, 2006 Order approving the settlement
concludes that "the rates resulting from the Stipulation are just and reasonable and that
approval of the Stipulation is in the public interest."71 This ultimate determination is
based upon several secondary findings that have already been identified and discussed
supra, at 24-25. The Appellants Opening Brief makes no attempt whatever to address
these Commission factual findings or their support in the record of this proceeding.
In summary, the Commission concluded:
Based on the findings of fact in the foregoing sections of this
Order, we conclude that Questar Gas' use of the C02
Removal Plant from and after February 1, 2005 to manage the
heat content of its gas supplies is prudent and that the partial
recovery of costs provided in the Stipulation is reasonable and

69

Utah Code Ann. §54-7-1 (3)(d)(i) (2001).

70

Utah Code §54-3-1 provides, in part: "[a]ll charges made demanded or received
by any public utility. .. shall be just and reasonable." Utah Code §54-4-4 provides, in
part, that if, after hearing, the Commission finds a rate unjust, unreasonable,
discriminatory, preferential, insufficient or otherwise in violation of any provisions of
law, "the commission shall determine the just, reasonable, or sufficient rate. .."
^Commission's January 6, 2006 Order, p. 40.
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in the public interest.72
The Appellants have not provided any credible evidence or argument to dispute the
Commission's conclusion.
C.

The Commission Followed the Requirements of Utah
Code §54-7-1 in Approving the Settlement at Issue.
The Appellants attack the Commission's approval of the settlement by asserting

the Commission "did not consider the significant and material facts related to the case" as
required by Utah Code Ann. §54-7-1(3)(d)(ii). Allegedly, the Commission did not
consider the earlier factual record when considering the advisability of the settlement
and, allegedly the only evidence it could have considered in the present record was
"hearsay."73 This latter assertion is so general and unsubstantiated it deserves little
response.
Other than the documentary information developed at the six technical conferences
which the Commission took administrative notice of, the evidence in the record is either
witness testimony that regulatory parties and their expert consultants probed and
evaluated through discovery, or sworn testimony of party witnesses given at the hearing
in support of the settlement. That the Appellants were not parties to this proceeding and
did not provide testimony does not make the evidence in the record hearsay or of no
probative value. If that were the case, settlements before trial or hearing by disputing

^Commission's January 6, 2006 Order, p.38.
73

Appellants' Opening Brief, p. 79.
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parties would never have evidentiary support. Moreover, if regulatory parties and public
utilities always had to go through the expense of a contested trial or adjudicative hearing
before they could settle a dispute, much of the incentive and benefit to be gained from
settling would be lost.74
The Appellants' assertion about the lack of proper evidence in the record repeats a
claim that Appellants Ball and Geddes made in written public witness statements filed
with the Commission after the hearing. The Commission answered that claim, stating:
While we take [administrative] notice [of the materials
developed during the technical conferences], we base our
findings and conclusions contained herein upon a thorough
examination of the entire evidentiary record in these dockets
and conclude that, absent any reliance on the noticed material,
the overwhelming weight of evidence admitted in these
proceedings, including testimony on the Stipulation, pre-filed
testimony, and the facts asserted in the application, support
both our conclusion that Questar Gas has acted prudently in
evaluating and choosing among the available alternatives and
our approval of the Stipulation.75
The Appellants attempt to dismiss this evidence in the record with the legally
erroneous appellation of "hearsay" falls far short of any credible refutation; and their
further disregard of the Commission's answer to that ; no credible evidence' charge in its

Utah Code Ann. §54-7-1(3)(a) expressly provides:
At any time before or during an adjudicative proceeding
before the Commission, the parties, between themselves or
with the commission or a commissioner, may engage in
settlement conferences and negotiations.
Commission's January 6, 2006 Order, p. 32, footnote 18.
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January 6, 2005 Order is not helpful either. In any case, their argument that the
Commission did not comply with the requirements of the settlement statute is groundless.
D,

Appellants' Assertions that the Commission Violated the Requirements
of Fair Notice and Due Process Are Untimely and Without Merit

The Appellants assert that they were given inadequate opportunity to be heard. They do
so despite the clear and unambiguous notice at the end of the Commission's August 2004
Order that it would pursue in a separate docket "a long-term solution" to the CBM
problem, despite four months of technical conferences that were properly noticed to the
public, and despite eight months of properly-noticed Commission proceedings.
Nowhere, however, do the Appellants respond to the Commission's determination,
in its January 6, 2006 Order on Request to Intervene, that Appellants Ball and Geddes
have only themselves to blame.76 While the Commission was addressing Appellants Ball
and Geddes' petition do intervene, its conclusion applies equally well to the other
Appellants.
Instead of refuting the Commission's conclusion, the Appellants just add more
unsubstantiated smoke. They argue that the Commission's order was unclear with respect
to whether the settlement process was in the public interest in this case. They also assert:
the Commission's docketing system is a "shambles" and its website "confusing;" the

^Commission's January 6, 2006 Order on Request to Intervene, Docket Nos. 04057-04; 04-057-09; 04-057-11; 04-057-13 and 05-057-01, p. 13.
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Commission opened too many dockets; and the Committee suddenly changed its longheld position of opposition to any rate recovery.77
None of these assertions have any merit. The regulatory effort to find a just and
reasonable solution to the CBM incompatibility problem that has occurred since the
August 2004 Commission Order has simply been too long, too extensive, too well noticed
by the media and by Commission notices of proceedings for the Appellants' assertions to
carry any credibility. At some point the issue becomes one of lack of diligence and
proper care and not lack of opportunity to be heard. In this case the Appellants moved
beyond that point months prior to the hearing on the settlement. If the process missed
something because they were not "heard/' they have only themselves to blame.
Amidst the smoke of Appellants' due process assertions, they also claim that the
Committee unexpectedly
"reversed its position, formerly refusing to give any quarter
on the recovery of costs for processing of gas, now agreeing
to fold the tent and withdraw from the field.78
Appellants' jousting metaphor is apt for how they apparently view the Committee's
statutory duty: one stakes out a position with grunts and postures and subsequently
emerges victorious or goes down valiantly fighting. The metaphor is very inapt, however,
where the field of battle is the court or hearing room and the weapon is evidence.

Appellants' Opening Brief, pp. 86-93.
Appellants' Opening Brief, p. 90. See also similar claim at p. 51.
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The Utility in this proceeding established a very complete and persuasive prima
facie case. Appellant Ball was well aware of that fact before his departure as Committee
Director. When the Committee retained expert consultants after his departure to analyze
the Utility's case and provide evidentiary "weapons," those expert consultants confirmed
the strength of the Utility's case; that changed circumstances had not only weakened the
Committee's earlier arguments for denying rate recovery of CBM processing costs, but
had substantially strengthened the Utility's entitlement claim to rate recovery.
That the parties ended up in negotiations in light of the evidence already in the
record prior to Appellant Ball's departure as Committee Director should surprise no one lest of all Appellants Ball and Geddes. The Committee had already authorized
exploratory discussions with the Utility while Appellant Ball was still its Director. In
summary, the Committee's reversal of position was neither sudden or capricious, and
should not have been unexpected to persons acquainted with Utility regulation.
As a final matter, the Appellants want the year-long regulatory process and
Commission proceeding reversed and/or repeated because now, after the process has been
completed, they consider Commission Chairman Campbell was biased and should have
recused himself from the process.79
As with their entire case, the Appellants are untimely with this claim as well. In
this instance, that untimeliness is fatal. They only raise the claim now because the

'Appellants' Opening Brief, at 94-95.
53

proceeding apparently turned out differently than they thought it would.
To ensure due process to all parties, and to eliminate the unfair possibility of
someone simply lying in wait to see how a proceeding ends to raise the trump card of bias
on the part of the judge or hearing officer, the law requires that claims of bias "be raised
as soon as practicable after a party has reasonable cause to believe that grounds for
disqualification exist."80 In that regard, this Court has stated:
While a motion to disqualify a judge should not be undertaken
lightly, it must be made promptly. A party who has a
reasonable basis for moving to disqualify a judge may not
delay in the hope of first obtaining a favorable ruling and then
complain only if the result is unfavorable. Not only is such a
tactic unfair, but it may evidence a belief that the judge is not
in fact biased. Furthermore, delay imposes unnecessary
disruption on both the judicial system and litigants. A
disqualification proceeding is a collateral attack on the
substantive claim, it disrupts orderly litigation, and it
necessarily results in significant additional costs to the parties.
Accordingly, a party must move with dispatch once a basis for
disqualification is discovered.81
Even if the Appellants' claim of bias had been timely raised, they have not
established bias on the part of Commission Chairman Campbell. The Chairman recused
himself from the earlier proceeding because he participated in developing the Division's
case and position before the Commission in that earlier proceeding. The Appellants have

90

Marcus v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 548 F.2d 1044,
1051 (D.C. Cir. 1976), as cited in Pharaon v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, 135 F.3rd 148, 155 (U.S. App. D.C. 1998).
%x

Madsen v. Prudential Federal Savings and Loan Association,, 767 P.2d 538, 542
(Utah 1988).
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shown no such conflict in this proceeding. If the basis of their claim is Chairman
Campbell is experienced and has expertise in dealing with the CBM issue, that is
considered an asset and not an unfair bias in administrative law generally and regulatory
law specifically where the issues often revolve around extremely technical matters
requiring expertise to appreciate and resolve. Indeed, were prior experience with the
subject matter grounds for disqualification, utility law disputes would rarely be heard and
decided by qualified commissioners.
This distinction is clearly drawn in a 1998 U.S. Court of Appeals case involving
the Federal Reserve System Board of Governors. In that case the petitioner raised
charges of bias against the administrative law judge hearing his case, claiming the ALJ
showed a record of ruling in favor of the Board of Governors in other proceedings as well
as allegedly incorrect prior rulings against the petitioner. The federal appeals court
rejected the claims, stating such evidence "falls far short of demonstrating that the ALJ
had 'a fixed opinion-a closed mind on the merits of the case/" 82
CONCLUSION
Appellants' Appeal should be dismissed for want of standing. But, even if
the Appellants' appearance before this Court were legally proper, their claim for relief is
without merit. It ignores the changed circumstances that have occurred since the closing
of the record underlying the Commission's August 2004 Order which are documented in

S2

Pharaon v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 135 F.3d 148,
155 (U.S. App. D.C. 1998).
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the record of this proceeding. It disregards the substantial savings regulatory parties were
able to secure in the settlement at issue. And, Appellants' objective of returning to the
status quo ante is unrealistic, unfair to the Utility, and harmful to the long-term best
interests of Utility ratepayers. It would not save ratepayers money, and would spawn
further costly legal disputes. The Committee, therefore, respectfully urges this Court to
dismiss the Appellant's appeal or reject their claim for relief as without merit.
Respectfully submitted Jhis 6thj&y of December,2006.
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